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Abstract
A new method of empirically computing the macroeconomic returns to public investment is
proposed. Pereira’s (2000) technique is modified, and a measure which accounts for both
public and private investment costs is suggested. An empirical application to US data shows
that differences between alternative ways of measuring rates of return are non-trivial - taking
into consideration the full investment effort halves estimated returns when partial public
costs only are considered.
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There  has  been  considerable  interest  in  measuring  the  effects  of  public  investment  on 
aggregate  economic  activity  since  Aschauer’s  (1989a,  1989b)  contributions
1.  However, 
Aschauer’s  reliance  on  static  OLS  regressions  has  long  been  superseded  by  more 
sophisticated techniques. VAR models have been widely used: apart from handling matters of 
stationarity and cointegration, they make it possible to address the issue of reverse causality 
between  output  and  public  capital,  and,  more  generally,  to  consider  the  dynamic  effects 
among those two variables and other production factors, such as private capital. The impact of 
public investment on its private counterpart is a major concern when analyzing the merits of 
the former.   
 
Dynamic  feedbacks,  however,  make  it  difficult  to  quantify  the  macroeconomic  return  on 
public capital. The microeconomic rate of return draws on the standard marginal product, 
which holds other inputs constant; it is therefore unable to account for effects of crowding in 
or out. Pereira (2000) proposed an alternative rate, anchored on a VAR estimate of the “total 
marginal  product”  of  public  investment:  this  marginal  product  is  based  on  the  long-term 
response of output to a shock to public investment, and therefore incorporates the dynamic 
behaviour  of  the  remaining  inputs  in  the  system.  Though  a  major  improvement  on  the 
microeconomic rate of return, we argue that Pereira’s  method fails to account for all the 
relevant investment costs in some circumstances. 
 
This paper proposes a new definition of rate of return on public investment that tackles the 
above  shortcomings.  In  section  2  we  present  our  preferred  measure  after  summarizing 
Pereira’s method and its limitations. Section 3 illustrates these different rates of return with a 
US dataset. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Alternative definitions of rates of return 
 
2.1 The partial-cost dynamic feedbacks rate of return 
 
We start by restating the methodology of Pereira (2000). Consider a VAR model with four 
endogenous variables, all in logs and first differenced: real public investment (G), real private 
investment  (I),  private  employment  and  real  private  GDP  (Y).  Following  an  orthogonal 
impulse to public investment, the long-term accumulated elasticity of Y with respect to G 
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where ∆ denotes a long-term response (i. e. the time horizon over which the IRFs converge). 
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where  Y/G  is  set  equal  to  an  end-of-sample  ten-year  average  of  the  output  to  public 
investment  ratio,  to  minimizes  contamination  by  cyclical  fluctuations.  This  marginal 
productivity  differs  from  its  microeconomic  counterpart,  as  it  drops  the  ceteris  paribus 
                                                 
1 See Batina (2001) for a survey of this literature.  
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assumption  and  includes  the  indirect  effects  of  public  investment  on  GDP  through  the 
dynamic responses of private inputs. 
 
Finally, assuming that capital goods last for 20 years, The annual rate of return on public 
investment is computed as the value of r that solves (1+r)
20 = MPG. For reasons explained 
below, we will call this rate the partial-cost dynamic feedbacks rate of return.     
 
2.2 A suggested alternative - the full-cost dynamic feedbacks rate of return 
 
It is important to include in the analysis the indirect output effects of public investment: 
taking on board the induced response of private inputs – and especially of private investment 
– boils down to accounting for possible crowding in or crowding out effects. Under many 
circumstances, however, the way investment costs are measured when computing a partial-
cost dynamic feedbacks rate of return is not appropriate. 
 
From a fiscal viewpoint, only the costs incurred by the public sector matter. Whatever the 
response of private investment, one should compare the cost of public investment alone to the 
total output gains (both direct and indirect), which generate further tax revenues. From a 
macroeconomic viewpoint, however, it is important to account for the full cost of investment, 
both  public  and  private.  If  crowding  in  (out)  takes  place,  the  previous  approach  is 
underestimating (overestimating) the total investment effort to achieve a given output change, 
and is therefore overestimating (underestimating) the return on public investment. To address 
this shortcoming, we can easily adapt the methodology of section 2.1. 
 
Following  a  structural  shock  to  public  investment,  we  compute  a  long-term  accumulated 
elasticity of Y with respect to private investment ( I ε ) and a long-term accumulated marginal 
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and we determine the return on public investment as the value of r that solves (1+r)
20 = 
MPTI, terming it the full-cost dynamic feedbacks rate of return. 
 
For completeness, and as a benchmark for comparisons, one can also measure the return to 
public  investment  when  private  investment  stays  constant  by  estimating  a  system  where 
private investment is an exogenous variable. The crowding in (out) mechanism is shutted 
down – private investment contemporaneous and lagged changes, even if they impinge on the 
system endogenous variables,  do not depend on the latter. The computational details are then 
similar to section 2.1. We call the ensuing rate the ceteris paribus rate of return. 
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3. An application to the US economy
2 
 
Our annual dataset is an update of Pereira’s (2000) and is obtained from the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis internet site. We measure private GDP, private investment and public 
investment excluding defense in constant 2000 dollars, and private employment in full time 
equivalent employees. The sample runs from 1956 to 2001.    
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests strongly suggest that the log-levels of these variables are non-
stationary, I(1) time series. Following the Johansen (1988) procedure, results from trace and 
maximum eigenvalue tests with a small sample correction suggested by Reimers (1992) do 
not allow us to safely dismiss the null hypothesis of no cointegration. We then proceed to 
estimate a VAR in first differences of log-levels. Starting with four lags, a constant and a 
deterministic trend, model reduction F-tests have lead us to consider a more parsimonious 
formulation – an order 3 VAR with a constant but without trend, further model reductions are 
not being acceptable as residuals would display autocorrelation.  
 
Orthogonal  disturbances  are  identified  through  a  Choleski  decomposition  with  public 
investment ordered first, as in Pereira (2000). Because of the lags in government decision-
making, it is assumed that public investment does not respond contemporaneously to any 
structural disturbances to the remaining variables.  
 
Table I 
Long-term estimated elasticities of private output with respect to investment 
  Public Investment  Private Investment 
VAR 1 (all variables endogenous)  0.1220  0.6407 
VAR 2 (exogenous private investment)  0.0769  not applicable 
 
Table I summarises results for long-term investment elasticities, derived from the converged 
accumulated IRFs. Using the output to investment average ratios in the ten final years of the 
sample, it becomes possible to compute the several marginal productivities and the implied 
rates of return presented in Table II. 
 
Table II 
Macroeconomic returns from public investment 
  Marginal productivity  Rate of return 
Partial-cost dynamic feedbacks  4.117  7.33% 
Full-cost dynamic feedbacks  2.058  3.68% 
Ceteris paribus  2.595  4.88% 
 
The partial-cost dynamic feedbacks rate of return is very close to 7.3 percent.
3 However, as 
public investment crowds in private investment, the full-cost dynamic feedbacks rate of return 
is much smaller – somewhat below 4 percent. For a similar reason (the exclusion of indirect 
output effects of public investment through induced private investment), the ceteris paribus 
rate of return is also smaller, lying close to 5 percent.   
 
                                                 
2 Econometric results were obtained using GiveWin and PcGive 10. See Doornik and Hendry (2001) for a 
complete software description. More detailed results are available from the authors on request. 
3  Pereira’s  (2000)  estimated  a  7.8  percent  rate  of  return.  Three  factors  explain  why  results  do  not  exactly 
coincide: (i) samples are different; (ii) due to data revisions, even figures for common years may somewhat 




This paper has analysed how to compute the rate of return on public investment in a VAR 
framework. VAR models allow us to take account of the dynamic response of private inputs 
to a shock to public investment, and hence to study whether the latter is a source of crowding 
in or crowding out. We incorporate dynamic feedbacks into the determination of the rate of 
return and suggest a measure which accounts for both public and private investment costs. 
Our prefered approach does not exclude from the computations the costs of induced private 
investment, and, therefore does not overestimate the macroeconomic returns to public capital 
if  there  is  crowding  in,  or  underestimates  them  if  crowding  out  occurs.  An  empirical 
application to US data shows that differences between alternative rates of return are non-
trivial: considering the whole investment effort actually halves estimated returns when partial 
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